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Abstract
This paper estimates the effect of the abolition of user charges for children’s outpatient care (30 CZK/1.2 EUR) in 2009
on the demand for ambulatory doctor visits in the Czech Republic. Because the reform applied only to children, we
can employ the difference-in-differences approach, where children constitute a treatment group and adults serve as a
control group. The dataset covers 1841 observations. Aside from the treatment effect, we control for a number of
personal characteristics using micro-level data (European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions). Using the
zero-inflated negative binomial model, we found no significant effect from the abolition of user charges on doctor
visits, suggesting either that user charges are ineffective in the Czech environment or that their value was set too low.
On the contrary, personal income, the number of household members and gender have a significant effect. A number
of robustness checks using restricted samples confirm the results.
Keywords: Co-payments, Outpatient care, Czech Republic, Natural experiment, Zero-inflated negative binomial
model (ZINB)
Background
In many countries, governments have been increasing
the rate of private participation in heath care expenses.
The Czech Republic is not an exception. In 2005, gen-
eral government expenditure amounted to 87.5 % of the
overall spending on healthcare, but by 2009, this share
had decreased to 83.6 % [9]. A number of reforms have
been introduced in recent years, including the introduc-
tion of user charges for healthcare services, which started
in January 2008 with the goal of reducing the unneces-
sary overuse of cost-free healthcare services by patients,
thereby saving public resources. Nevertheless, in 2009
user charges for physician visits were abolished for chil-
dren.
Three types of user charges were introduced in the
Czech Republic in January 2008: CZK 30/1.2 EUR for
physician visits during which a clinical examination was
carried out; CZK 30/1.2 EUR for every item on a drug
prescription; CZK 60/2.4 EUR for each day of inpatient
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care; and CZK 90/3.6 EUR for emergency service. This
reform received extensive discussion. Advocates argued
that user charges would have the desired effect and
patients would decrease their overutilization of healthcare
services because they would think twice about whether
they needed to go to the doctor, i.e., the moral haz-
ard would decrease significantly as suggested by [6], who
addresses the theory of demand for health care. Feld-
stein [6] highlights that moral hazard results in the inef-
ficient use of healthcare services and suggests that the
introduction of co-payments is an effective way to reduce
overutilization. Consequently, waiting times for physi-
cal examinations and planned surgeries would shorten,
which should contribute to overall patient satisfaction
with the particular service. In aggregate then, even this
small amount of user charges should bring additional
funds to the healthcare system.
To the contrary, opponents of the reform argued that
in the Czech Republic (CR), the introduction of user
charges would not have a significant effect on the demand
for health-care services because this demand is not very
price-elastic. Others claimed that user charges should at
least not be applied to some vulnerable groups because
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their utilization of health-care services is appropriate, not
excessive, and user charges could have a detrimental and
inequitable effect on their health status as supported by
[7, 15, 25] and [24]. As a result, in April 2009, user charges
on physician visits were abolished for children up to 18
years of age, and a cap on copayments for the elderly (over
65) was decreased from CZK 5000 to CZK 2500.
Similar reforms introducing user charges have been
tackled in other Visegrad countries. In 2007, Hungary
instituted a 600 Forint/2.4 EUR user charge for a GP visit
and 300 Forint/1.2 EUR charge for a specialist visit with
a GP’s referral. A public referendum, however, abolished
these a year later [2]. Slovakia instituted user charges
in 2002, but a new government that took over in 2006
immediately abolished user charges [23].
The first studies to assess the effectiveness of user
charges include [8, 16] and [17], who use data from a
US social experiment - the Rand Health Insurance Exper-
iment (HIE). All of these studies consistently find that
in the short term, user charges that are too low do not
reduce excessive care and user charges that are too high
can result in avoiding necessary healthcare. These stud-
ies also show that for a person of average health and with
average income, a reasonable level of user charges does
not have a negative influence on health status. Saltman
et al. [19], however, argue that these effects from cost-
sharing arrangements may be valid only in the US and that
studies performed in other countries could find different
results.
As far as later studies are concerned, user charges on
physician visits were found not to reduce demand for
health-care services in South Korea [13] and in France [3].
Other studies find mixed results. In Japan [12], the effect
of increased copayments for physician visits was found
to be negative and statistically significant only for a two-
year panel, but the effect was not clear for data acquired
for longer periods. This phenomenon was interpreted as
a transitory effect. In Belgium, [4] found negative effects
from increased user charges on the demand for three
types of physician services (GP office visits, GP home
visits, specialist visits); however, in disaggregation, the
effect was insignificant for men visiting GP offices and
for women visiting a specialist. In Germany, [29] found
that an increase in user charges for drug prescriptions ful-
filled its purpose of reducing the number of outpatient
doctor visits. However, as [1] and [22] discovered, further
German reforms that introduced user charges for the first
doctor visit in each quarter in 2004 failed to reduce the
number of physician visits. Significance and the effect of
user charges thus depend on the amount, frequency of
payment, type and characteristics of each country.
The effect of user charges in the Czech Republic has
been estimated only by [30] and [11] to date. Zapal [30]
estimated the effect of user charges on the number of
children’s physician visits in the Czech Republic, proxy-
ing the number of doctor visits by the number of drug
prescriptions under the assumption that there is a fixed
probability of generating prescriptions during a doctor
visit. The author detects a positive and significant effect
from user charges only if March 2009 (one month before
the reform) is used as a pre-reform period, i.e., there is
only a timing effect because some visits (e.g., preventive
care) might have been postponed, resulting in fewer vis-
its prior to the reform and more visits after it. In a natural
experiment, [11] estimated the effect of user charges on
healthcare utilization among the Czech population above
50 years of age using data from the Survey of Health,
Aging and Retirement in Europe (SHARE). She found a
significant decrease in ambulatory doctor visits after the
introduction of user charges but an insignificant effect
from the reform on the amount of hospital care provided.
Except for [13], who conducted a conditional-on-use
analysis, all of the cited research papers investigate the
effect of user charges on doctor visits using the difference-
in-differences (DiD) methodology. In the Czech environ-
ment, [30] takes advantage of the co-payment exemption
for children introduced in 2009 and uses children’s drug
consumption as a treatment group and drug consumption
among adults as a control group. He employs Ordinary
Least Squares (OLS). Kalousova [11] assumes that the
Czech Republic and Poland would experience identical
trends were it not for the introduction of user charges
in the Czech Republic. In her experiment, the Czech
population constitutes a treatment group and the Polish
population serves as control group. She employs logistic
regression and binomial models.
Wewill contribute to this stream of research and analyze
the effects of user charges on the number of outpatient
visits in the Czech Republic. We will estimate the effect
of the 2009 abolition of user charges for children and thus
find whether the introduction of regulatory fees in the
Czech Republic reduced the overutilization of outpatient
healthcare services. In our natural experiment, we will
assume elastic healthcare demand for both children and
adults, which is supported by [20].
As opposed to [11], both the treatment and control
groups will be subsets of the Czech population, which
allows us to relax the assumption about identical trends
for the Czech Republic and Poland, which we consider
to be quite restricting given the different institutions in
the respective countries. In addition, we will not limit
ourselves to the elderly (50+), as opposed to [11]. In
our experiment, 281 children will constitute a treatment
group, whereas the rest of the population (1,560 adults)
will serve as a control group. We will take advantage of
the fact that the dividing line (18 years) is exogeneously
(administratively) given and assume that the trend is the
same for both groups. The appropriateness of the identical
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trend assumption will be tested in a robustness check in
which we restrict the control group (18+) to the age group
18–26. As opposed to [30], we will use micro-level data
on the number of doctor visits made by individuals during
the 12 previous months, as obtained from the European
Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-
SILC survey). Moreover, a longer time period allows us
to eliminate the timing effect from the postponed utiliza-
tion of health-care services observed by [30]. Due to the
distributional properties of the dependent variable (num-
ber of doctor visits), we will avoid OLS, as opposed to
[30], and logistic regression and the binomial model, as
opposed to [11], and use the zero-inflated negative bino-
mial (ZINB) model, which provides a better fit to the data
due to skewness and a large number of zero doctor vis-
its in the dataset. Consistent with [30] and as opposed to
[11], our analysis covers the area of the city of Prague only
because co-payment arrangements are different outside of
Prague. Furthermore, there is believed to be hardly any
patient spillover from Prague to other regions because (i)
the quality of healthcare services is generally perceived to
be same or better in Prague than in the rest of the Czech
Republic and (ii) the cost of travel outside Prague is higher
than 30 CZK/1.2 EUR.
Our research questions are as follows: (1) Did the aboli-
tion of outpatient user charges have a significant effect on
the demand for outpatient doctor visits? (2) How do indi-
vidual characteristics such as sex and income affect the
demand for ambulatory healthcare services?
If the number of children physician visits increased after
the abolition of user charges in 2009, the introduction of
regulatory fees in 2008 would have been effective in reduc-
ing demand. We however found an insignificant effect,
i.e., the number of children’s outpatient visits (treatment
group) did not significantly change after the abolition of
regulatory charges. The results suggest that the reform
either did not have an effect or that the user charges which
the reform abolished were too small to have an effect on
the behavior of patients. We further discovered that the
probability of visiting a doctor increases for women and
decreases with personal income and the number of house-
hold members. Note that we are limited by the sample
size of 1,841 individuals, which includes 15 % of children
(members of the treatment group). If more data was avail-
able, the estimates would by definition be more accurate
due to lower variance. The results are nevertheless not
biased by the disproportionate number of members in
the treatment and control groups which is confirmed by
a number of robustness checks. Eight robustness checks
were carried out with alternative control groups and esti-
mation methods.
The paper is organized as follows: “Data and methods”
Section introduces the dataset and explains the the-
oretical underpinnings, “Results” Section presents and
discusses the results of the analysis, and “Discussion and




The data come from the Czech Statistical Office (CZSO),
the EU-SILC survey, which is an annual survey of house-
hold income and living conditions and includes data on
health related variables, such as the number of doctor
visits during the 12 previous months, and respondent
characteristics associated with a tendency toward health-
care utilization (age, sex, educational level, marital status,
employment status, household income per year, number
of children in a household, etc.) [5]. The respondents
above 16 years of age answer the questions themselves,
while legal guardians answered on behalf of children
younger than 16. These children are included in our
sample because answers on behalf of children are not
considered to be a problem for the purpose of our analysis.
Our sample covers only two interview years (2009, 2010)
because information regarding the utilization of health
services in the past 12 months was not included in ear-
lier surveys and because data for later years are not
available. We restricted the sample such that all answers
refer fully either to the period before the reform, which
took place in April 2009, or after it to avoid bias in the
results due to overlap. Because we know the exact day
of each interview, we limited the sample to two inter-
view periods: (1) From February to March 2009, i.e.,
responses regarding the number of doctor visits in the
past 12 months effectively refer to the period between
February 2008–March 2009 when user charges were
obligatory for all, and (2) From April to May 2010, i.e.,
responses refer to healthcare utilization between April
2009–May 2010 when children were exempted from user
charges.1
From the overall sample, we excluded all people living
outside of Prague because the data for the rest of the coun-
try could be contaminated by the fact that other regional
governments except Prague reimbursed adults for co-
payments in all regional hospitals (but not others) during
the observed period. Being unable to distinguish whether
the patient took advantage of reimbursement could influ-
ence our estimated results. Moreover, we suppose that
people living in Prague always go to a doctor in Prague
because all types of primary and secondary care are repre-
sented there and the capital is generally perceived by the
public to provide higher quality healthcare. Additionally,
if a Prague citizen wanted to avoid paying user charges by
going to a doctor outside Prague, his travel costs would
exceed CZK 30/1.2 EUR. Lastly, we truncated our sample
at 20 visits. The final dataset covers 97.3 % of the non-
truncated set and includes 1,841 individuals - 281 children
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and 1,560 adults. The proportion of children and adults is
consistent with the overall sample.
Dependent variable
The dependent variable visits denotes the number of
physician visits (generalist or specialist with and without
a referral) made by an individual during the 12 previous
months. The frequency distribution in Fig. 1 indicates a
rapidly decreasing tail and suggests that the distribution is
not normal.
The maximum number of visits is 99; however, only
2.7 % of respondents exceed 20 visits. The density of
observations above 20 visits is also extremely low (Fig. 1).
We thus truncated the sample at 20 visits. We suppose
that some of the high values may be results of measure-
ment errors; others may be brought about by the elderly
(over 65), who visit doctors more often. Truncation at 20
visits eliminates these erroneous observations as well as
removes a potential bias stemming from a decreased cap
on out-of-pocket contributions for the elderly introduced
in 2009. In other words, we assume that a greater num-
ber of visits (made mostly by the elderly and chronically
ill) is refunded because these individuals are also expected
to pay out-of-pocket at the pharmacy, which adds to the
copayment limit as well.
Independent variables
Aside from the interaction term, which captures the effect
of the reform, there are other independent variables that
are likely to influence the number of outpatient visits and
reflect characteristic differences among patients.
The variable female is a dummy taking on the value of 1
for a female and 0 for a male. The mean (Table 1) reveals
that our sample contains approximately the same number
of men and women. We expect a positive effect from this
variable because women have a larger number of comor-
bidities than men, which is proved for instance by [18]
and [28].
The variable log_income_memb denotes the net dis-
posable income of a household per year (as defined by
the EU) divided by the number of household members.
This variable enters the regressions in natural logarithms
because in natural units, it takes on a wide range of val-
ues. The impact of this variable may be two-fold: (a) With
increasing income, the number of doctor visits may grow
because money spent on health-care expenses becomes
unimportant. This effect is supported for example by
[26]; (b) With increasing income, the number of doc-
tor visits decreases because people have a better lifestyle
(they buy better food, shoes, mattresses, etc.) as well as
health status. However, a low number of doctor visits for
high income individuals may also be caused by the high
opportunity costs of going to the doctor and not work-
ing, which is supported by [27], who found a higher use
of GP care among lower-income groups. The final effect
depends on which of these two effects outweighs the
other.
The number of household members (members) takes on
values from 1 to 7. We include this variable in the anal-
ysis based on [21], who found a significant effect from
family size on health care utilization. Through the num-
ber of household members, we also try to capture relevant
household characteristics to minimize dependence in the
error term because with the available data, we cannot
cluster members of the same family and capture their
fixed attributes. Because there are 3 members in a median
Fig. 1 Frequency distribution - visits
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Table 1 Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Median
Female 0.528 0.499 0 1 1
Visits 3.539 4.533 0 20 2
Members 2.806 1.211 1 7 3
Reform 0.382 0.486 0 1 0
Dummy_child 0.153 0.36 0 1 0
Interaction 0.062 0.241 0 1 0
Log_income_memb 12.002 0.494 10.375 14.271 11.948
family in our sample (Table 1), the dependence is not
expected to cause trouble in the analysis.2
We suppose a negative influence from this variable
because increasing the number of household members
may represent higher opportunity costs for the primary
care-taker (e.g., to find baby-sitting) or tighter budget
constraints for the family as a whole.3
Summary statistics for all variables are provided in
Table 1. A correlation matrix can be provided upon
request by the authors.
Method
Difference-in-differences approach
The abolition of user charges for children’s outpatient vis-
its in 2009 constitutes a natural experiment with children’s
physician visits being the treatment group and physician
visits for the rest of the population being the control
group.
The DiD approach is based on a comparison of the aver-
age change in physician visits for children before and after
the reform with the average change in physician visits for
the adults. If we compared pre-reform and post-reform
periods for the treatment group only, the results could be
contaminated by trends that are unrelated to the reform.
A parallel trend assumption for both groups must hold,
however, to allow general conclusions to be drawn from
the analysis. In our case, we assume that without the
reform, the development of the trend in both the group of
children and the adults would be the same, and thus, we
could draw a conclusion regarding the effect of the reform
for the entire population and not just the population of
children. The appropriateness of this assumption will be
tested in a robustness check using a restricted control
group.
To find the effects of the reform, we estimate a model of
the form:
visitsi = β0 + β1reformi + β2dummy_childi (1)
+ β3interactioni + β4female
+ β5members + β6log_income_memb + εi
where i ∈ 1, . . .N denotes individuals. The variable
visits reflects the number of doctor visits for person i.
Reform is a dummy variable representing the period after
the reform. The variable dummy_child is a dummy vari-
able that takes the value of 1 for respondents younger
than 18 and 0 otherwise. In other words, this variable
denotes the treatment group, i.e., the group on which the
reform had an effect. The interaction term equals reform×
dummy_child and takes the value 1 for children (members
of the treatment group) and the period after the reform.
The variable female takes the value of 1 if the respondent
is a woman. The variable members denotes members of
the household, and the variable income_memb represents
the personal income of individual i. The parameter εi is
the error term.
We are particularly interested in the estimate of β3
because it gives us the net treatment effect, which mea-
sures the change in physician visits for a child caused by
the abolition of user charges – it is the DiD estimator.
If positive, the number of doctor visits for children rises
relative to the number of visits for adults.
Zero-inflated negative binomial model
Because the distribution of the dependent variable visits
is skewed and contains a large proportion of zeros, we use
a count data model, specifically the zero-inflated negative
binomial model (ZINB).
The ZINB model consists of two submodels because it
assumes that zero values for the dependent variable are
generated from two different processes [14]: (i) A respon-
dent was not ill over the year and therefore did not visit a
doctor and (ii) a respondent was ill, but still did not visit a
doctor.
The first submodel is negative binomial and models the
count process, i.e., how often respondents visit a physi-
cian. The dependent variable takes the value 0–20. The
second process is modeled by a logit model for binary
data to capture the probability that the respondent was
ill but still did not visit a doctor. The dependent variable
is a latent (unobserved) variable taking the value of 0 if
the particular zero number of visits is likely to be caused
by the fact that the respondent did not go to the doctor
because he was healthy and taking the value of 1 if the zero
number of visits is likely to be caused by the avoidance of
healthcare even if sick.
Results
We estimate Eq. 1. The estimation results are provided in
Table 2.4
The estimated coefficient of the interaction term, which
denotes the treatment effect, i.e., the effect of the reform
that abolished user charges for children, is insignificant
in both parts of Table 2. This analysis thus reveals that
the reform did not significantly change the utilization of
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Table 2 Zero-inflated negative binomial model
Number of obs = 1841
Non-zero obs = 1176
Zero obs = 665
LR χ2(6) = 79.38
Prob> χ2 = 0.0000
Visits Coef.


















Likelihood-ratio test of α = 0: χ¯2(01) = 1393.26 Pr≥ χ¯2 = 0.0000
Vuong test of zinb vs. standard negative binomial: z = 6.91 Pr>z = 0.0000
Notes: *p <=0.1, **p <=0.05, ***p <=0.01
In order to interpret coefficients of the log–linear model, exponentiating is
necessary; exp(coeff)
doctor visits consistent with, for example, [13] and [3].
Specifically, the effect of the abolition of user charges for
children was found not to play a role either in the first
part of Table 2, which models how many times respon-
dents visit a doctor, or in the second part of Table 2, which
estimates the odds of not going to the doctor even when
sick. In other words, the probability of avoiding healthcare
if sick did not change after the reform; the reform also did
not change the frequency of doctor visits.
If the reform had an effect, the coefficient of the inter-
action term would have been significantly positive in the
first part of Table 2 and significantly negative in the second
part of Table 2 because one would expect the number of
doctor visits to increase and the odds of avoiding health-
care even if sick to decrease as a result of the abolition of
user charges.
The first part of Table 2 further suggests that women are
expected to visit the doctor 1.21 more times thanmen and
a one-unit increase in the logarithm of personal income
decreases the expected number of visits to the doctor by
0.71. These results confirm the findings of [18] and [28].
Also, the more householdmembers there are, the less they
are expected to visit a doctor, consistent with our assump-
tions. However, the specific reason for this result is yet
to be clarified. We suppose that larger families may have
a tighter budget constraint or the primary care-taker in
larger families may face higher opportunity costs in terms
of finding, e.g., baby-sitting.
The signs of all the coefficients for personal charac-
teristics in the second part of Table 2 are opposite (if
significant) to the signs of those in the first part of this
table because each answers the question from a different
perspective. The results in both parts of Table 2 thus nicely
complement each other. The second part of Table 2 sug-
gests that if a woman did not visit a doctor during last 12
months, it was more likely caused by the fact that she was
healthy and hence did not need to visit a doctor than by
the fact that she would avoid healthcare if sick. If members
of larger families tend to go less frequently to the doctor
(first part of the table), then they also more likely avoid
seeing a doctor if sick. Income was found not to play a
role in determining whether a respondent is likely or not
to avoid healthcare services if sick.
Robustness checks
We conducted four robustness checks to test the appro-
priateness of the assumptions applied to the primary
analysis, including the parallel trend assumption5. As the
number of members in the control group of each of the
four robustness checks decreases relative to the main
analysis, we check also for a potential bias resulting from
a different size of the treatment and control groups in the
main analysis.6
Additionally, all analyses, i.e., the full sample and the
robustness checks, were re-estimated using a multino-
mial logit regression model (MNL), which estimates the
probability of a change in the number of physician visits
after April 2009. All results are consistent with those of
the ZINB model and are available upon request from the
authors.
Children vs. adults aged 18 to 26
The first robustness check is the core test of the
parallel trend assumption, i.e., of the assumption that
trends for the group of children and adults included
in the analysis would be the same were it not for
the reform applied to children. The control group cov-
ers only people aged 18 to 26 based on the assump-
tion that the behavior of children and young people
close to the administratively set borderline of adulthood
should be more similar than that of children and older
adults.
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The results are provided in column 3 of Table 3 and
reveal an insignificant effect from the interaction term in
either part of the table, consistent with the primary analy-
sis. Thus, we prove that the reform did not influence either
the number of doctor visits or the probability of avoid-
ing healthcare if sick. However in this analysis, no per-
sonal characteristics considered significantly influenced
the dependent variable except that sex and the number
of household members in the model estimate the proba-
bility of avoiding healthcare if sick. The magnitude of the
effects of these two variables is weaker than in the primary
analysis, but the directions of these effects are consistent.
Specifically, being a woman decreases the probability of
not going to the doctor even if sick by 0.38 and living
in larger households increases it by 1.51, all else being
equal.
The insignificant effect of the remaining environmental
variables is not a surprise considering that the two groups
are assumed to be even more alike than the treatment and
control groups of the primary analysis. We thus proved
that the parallel trend assumption of the primary analysis
holds even for the group of children and the rest of the
population.
Children vs. childless adults
In the second robustness check, only childless adults are
included in the control group based on the assumption
that parents may be partly influenced by the reform as
well: because when they no longer pay for their children’s
visits, they may change their own decisions concerning
physician visits for which they make co-payments. In
other words, we check whether the behavior of parents
and children is independent of each other.
The results, which are provided in column 4 of Table 3,
are consistent with the primary analysis and reveal both
the insignificance of the interaction term and the strong
significance and identical direction of the effects of the
environmental variables as before, suggesting that parents’
decisions regarding the number of their own doctor visits
are independent of those made on behalf of their children.
Table 3 Zero-inflated negative binomial model: robustness checks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Control group Adults aged 18 to 26 Childless adults Adults without the elderly Employed adults up to 65 years
Number of obs = 494 Number of obs = 1243 Number of obs = 1471 Number of obs = 1117
Non-zero obs = 130 Non-zero obs = 735 Non-zero obs = 837 Non-zero obs = 579
Zero obs = 364 Zero obs = 508 Zero obs = 634 Zero obs = 538
LR χ2(6) = 3.60 LR χ2(6) = 103.38 LR χ2(6) = 38.56 LR χ2(6) = 20.64
Prob> χ2 = 0.7301 Prob> χ2 = 0.0000 Prob> χ2 = 0.0000 Prob> χ2 = 0.0021
Count process
reform –0.249 –0.015 0.034 0.109
dummy_child 0.172 –0.023 –0.072 0.133
interaction -0.659 –0.246 –0.583 –0.851
female –0.116 0.144** 0.368*** 0.355***
members –0.029 –0.265*** –0.059* 0.016
log_income_memb –0.158 –0.461*** –0.202*** –0.003
_cons 3.142 7.608*** 3.675*** 0.872
Logit
reform 0.725 0.807*** 1.617*** 1.605***
dummy_child 3.284*** 3.415*** 4.765*** 5.042***
interaction –0.233 –0.106 –0.988 –1.020
female –0.967*** –0.881*** –1.334*** –1.462***
members 0.414** 0.660*** 0.471*** 0.333**
log_income_memb 0.299 0.246 0.115 0.122
_cons –5.532 –5.895** –4.809 –4.567
lnα –0.443 –0.757 –0.219 –0.242
α 0.642 0.469 0.804 0.785
Notes: *p <=0.1, **p <=0.05, ***p <=0.01
In order to interpret coefficients of the log–linear model, exponentiating is necessary; exp(coeff)
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Children vs. adults without the elderly
Although we already restricted our dependent variable to
20 visits in the primary analysis, assuming that the elderly
go to the doctor more often, in the third robustness check,
we further restrict the control group to the adults without
the elderly (over 65) based on the fear that the results of
the primary analysis may still be slightly biased due to the
decreased cap on co-payments for the elderly introduced
in 2009. The reason is that there are not only copayments
for doctor visits, but also copayments for inpatient care
and all out-of-pocket payments in the pharmacy that sum
up to the limit. Once the limit is exceeded, the patient
is eligible for reimbursement regardless of the number
of doctor visits. Thus, there are only people aged 18–64
included in the control group.
The results provided in column 5 of Table 3 are consis-
tent with our previous estimates. The coefficients of the
interaction term in both parts of the table are statistically
insignificant. Thus, we verified that the abolition of user
charges did not have a significant effect on the number
of doctor visits even if the elderly were excluded from the
control group nor did it affect the probability of avoiding
healthcare if sick. The results of the primary analysis are
thus by no means distorted by the decreased copayment
cap applied to the elderly. It is believed that the decreased
protective limit may have rather significantly influenced
the number of drug prescriptions or the utilization of
health-care services above 20 outpatient visits.
All individual characteristics are jointly significant,
which is consistent with the results of our primary analy-
sis. There is only a slight decrease in the significance of the
variable members from a 1 % significance level to a 10 %
level.
If we consider that the elderly live more often in
smaller households, the variable representing the num-
ber of household members then naturally plays a more
important role in the primary analysis when the elderly
are included. Put differently, the elderly are believed to be
responsible for the stronger significance of this variable in
the primary analysis.
Children vs. employed adults up to 65 years
In the fourth robustness check, there are only employed
adults younger than 65 years in the control group based
on the assumption that the employed are less affected
by worse labor market conditions after the wake of the
economic crisis at the end of 2008.
The results provided in column 6 of Table 3 are consis-
tent with the primary analysis in terms of the treatment
effect. Thus, we verified that the insignificant effect of
the abolition of user charges is robust even to the joint
exclusion of the unemployed and the elderly from the
control group. Labor market conditions are perceived to
work through the income variable, which also became
insignificant in the first part of the table. Thus, if only the
employed are included in the control group, the decision
as to how many times to go to the doctor and whether
to avoid healthcare if sick is not influenced by income.
However, even this analysis proved that women go to the
doctor more often and are less likely to avoid healthcare if
sick. In addition, the number of householdmembers influ-
ences the probability of not going to the doctor even when
sick, increasing it by 1.4; the number of doctor visits is not
influenced by the number of household members.
Discussion and conclusion
This paper investigates the effect of the abolition of user
charges on the demand for ambulatory doctor visits. It
analyzes the EU-SILC micro-level data from the 2009
and 2010 surveys. The reform is a natural experiment in
which children constitute a treatment group and the rest
of the population serves as a control group. The natu-
ral experiment took place effectively in the city of Prague.
Prague is the capital and the largest city in the Czech
Republic; many specialized medical centers are situated
there, including 5 out of 11 teaching hospitals (as of 2009).
We abstract from any possible spillover effect because (i)
no regional substitute exists for specialized care provided
in Prague and (ii) regional substitutes for regular care are
significantly more expensive due to considerable travel
costs. In other words, it is quite common to obtain special-
ized treatment in Prague even if residing somewhere else,
but hardly any Prague citizen would use a hospital outside
Prague to avoid the user fees.
A zero-inflated negative binomial model was used as the
estimation method. The model expresses the probability
of visiting a doctor as a combination of two submodels,
assuming that the zero number of doctor visits is gener-
ated by two different processes: (i) a respondent was not
ill and therefore did not visit a doctor (but would visit if
sick), and (ii) a respondent was ill, but still did not visit a
doctor.
Our results show an insignificant effect from the abo-
lition of user charges on the number of doctor vis-
its, consistent with a number of previous studies, e.g.,
[3, 13, 30], etc. These results suggest that user charges for
ambulatory doctor visits are either ineffective in reducing
the overuse of healthcare services in the Czech environ-
ment or that their value was just set too low.
These results are not expected to be significantly dis-
torted by a temporary effect, as found by [30]. Our data
are collected over a period 12 times longer, i.e., we assess
a period of one year - not one month, in which the peo-
ple could indeed postpone the consumption of healthcare
from the pre-reform period to the post-reform period
to avoid user charges. As we expect both temporary
and long-term effects to be non-negative, the resulting
observed effect, which is their sum, is also expected to be
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non-negative if significant. However, the observed effect
is insignificant here. Thus, if we subtract the temporary
effect, the long-term effect must also be insignificant. By
the same token, even if the discovered effect was deemed
to be just temporary, i.e., one believes that people post-
pone healthcare consumption for a year to avoid user
charges, the long-term effect would be even less signifi-
cant than the observed one. Thus, a longer time period
of observations, even if available, would not enhance the
analysis in terms of the direction and significance of the
effect.
Sex, personal income and the number of household
members all proved to have a significant effect on the
demand for outpatient care - being a woman increases
the number of doctor visits, and the number of household
members and personal income decrease it, suggesting that
richer people have considerable opportunity costs from
visiting a doctor. The finding that the bigger the house-
hold is, the less its members visit the doctor may also be
explained by opportunity costs for both the primary care-
taker and the bread-winner. Additionally, larger families
are likely to face tighter budget constraints than smaller
families. The specific reason for the direction of this effect
is left as a motivation for further research.
The results further reveal that the odds of avoiding
healthcare even if sick do not significantly change after
the abolition of co-payments. The probability of not going
to the doctor even if sick increases with the number of
household members and decreases when the respondent
is a woman.
The insignificant effect from the abolition of co-
payments on the number of outpatient doctor visits
proved to be robust to alternative control groups. Only
minor changes in the effect of environmental variables in
the alternative models were recognized.
Specifically, we tested that the control group of adults
and the treatment group of children would experience the
same trend were it not for the abolition of user charges
for children in 2009. For this purpose, we restricted the
control group to individuals aged 18–26 who were com-
pared against children (0–18). The results were consistent
with the primary analysis, confirming the accuracy of
the parallel trend assumption. Second, we took childless
adults as a control group and found that the behav-
ior of the adults regarding their doctor visits and the
doctor visits of their children are independent. Third,
we tested for the presence of bias resulting from the
decreased cap on co-payments from the elderly, which
was also introduced in 2009. Restricting the control group
to the adults without elderly, we rejected the presence
of this type of bias in our primary analysis. Fourth, we
tested whether deteriorated labor market conditions due
to the financial crisis played any role. When excluding the
elderly and unemployed jointly from the control group,
we found no significant effect from labor market income.
Fifth, the different numbers of observations in the con-
trol groups of the alternative models rejected a potential
bias resulting from a different proportion of observa-
tions in the control and treatment groups in the main
analysis.
Our primary results for a sample of the entire Czech
population differ from the result reached by [11], who
analyzed only the elderly, who may behave differently
compared to the rest of the population. We accounted
for the extreme behavior of the elderly by (i) truncating
the dependent variable to 20 visits and (ii) conducting a
robustness check excluding the elderly.
Still, the results of our analysis should be inter-
preted with limitations and could be extended in a
number of ways. First, we assessed the effect of a
small price change, which cannot predict how people
respond to bigger price changes. Second, due to data
availability, only 1841 observations were analyzed. A
larger dataset would, by definition, decrease variance
of the estimates making them more accurate. Third,
the time period examined covered only two years of
observations. A longer time period would by no means
enhance the analysis in terms of the effect of the reform
because the strongest response to the abolition of user
charges would be right after its implementation. If data
for additional years were available in the panel struc-
ture, we may however obtain additional information
regarding fixed individual and household characteristics.
This possibility also serves as a motivation for further
research.
When conducting this analysis, we could not distinguish
between emergency and ordinary visits due to data avail-
ability. If we are able to analyze such disaggregated data,
we would additionally discover whether the people in the
Czech Republic are sensitive in terms of the structure of
user charges. In other words, we may find that it pays
for some to wait a day or two before they go to a doc-
tor. Considering that CZK 90/3.6 EUR for an emergency
visit is three times the amount of the user charge for an
ordinary ambulatory visit, one may find a more profound
effect from the reform in this situation. At the same time,
our present results are not assumed to suffer from large
distortions because emergency ambulatory visits are sig-
nificantly less frequent than ordinary visits, accounting for
only 4 % of all ambulatory visits in 2009 [10]. This type of
additional analysis is a motivation for further research.
Regardless, the user charge of 30 CZK/1.2 EUR for an
ambulatory visit was found to be ineffective in the Czech
environment. The task for a policy-maker and for further
research is thus to discover what, if any, the appropriate
amount and structure of user charges would need to be
to decrease overuse of cost-free healthcare services in the
Czech Republic.
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Endnotes
1Interviews take place only between February–May
each year.
2Autocorrelation in the error term was rejected by a
bootstrap analysis with 50, 500 and 1,000 replications.
Results are available upon request from the authors.
3The variable number of children in the household was
also tested, but the number of household members was
deemed to be more appropriate because families may take
care of children, elderly parents, or both.
4A significant lnα suggests overdispersion, which
proves that the ZINB is appropriate. Moreover, the LR test
of Vuong, which compares the ZINB model to the stan-
dard NB model, indicates that the ZINB model should be
preferred to the NB regression model even at a 1 % sig-
nificance level. Moreover, the likelihood-ratio statistic of
79.38, which has an χ2 distribution, reveals that the full
model fits significantly better than an empty model.
5An alternative test to check the parallel trend assump-
tion is to conduct a placebo analysis, which was however
impossible due to the setting of the reform and data
availability.
6Number of treatment group observations = number of
observations - 281.
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